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THE LAW OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:
UNITED STATES POLICY IN CUBA (1898) AND IN
THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (1965)

*

by
David S. Bogen

1,:1.c

Just a year ago, on April 28, 1965, United States Marines entered
the city of Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic. 1 Such a sight was
not unfamiliar to Latin Americans during the first quarter of this century. In fact, the United States had occupied the Dominican Republic
itself from 1916 until 1924. Nevertheless, the event marked an innovation in recent American foreign policy, since the United States had not
so intervened in Latin America for more than three decades, Furthermore, the action was in direct contravention of Article 15 of the Charter
of the Organization of American States which provides: "No State or
group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for
any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other
State."
President Johnson explained this intervention as a matter of selfdefense -- at first for the frotection of American citizens then residing
in the Dominican Republic and later for the national security. 3 Within
a few days the President's rationale shifted as the immediate danger
assumed the character of chaos, rather than a clear communist threat,

*©

, 1966, by the author, reproduced herein by permission. This
paper was originally presented in connection with Professor Louis
Sohn 1 s Seminar on International Protection of Human Rights,

**

LL.B. 1965.

1.

N.Y. Times, April 29, 1965, p. 1, col. 8.

2.

"For two days American forces have been in Santo Domingo in an
effort to protect the lives of Americans and nationals of other
states in the face of increasing violence and disorder. 11 President
Johnson, quoted inN. Y. Times, May 1, 1965, p. 6, col. 4.

3.

"The American nations cannot, must not, and will not permit the
establishment of another Communist government in the Western
Hemisphere. 11 President Johnson, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1965,
p. 10, col. 4.
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Thus, the United States began to justify its continued military presence
as a stop-gap measure until the Organization of American States could
effectively act. 4 The right to intervene became dependent upon the
right of the Organization of American States to intervene. That organization did not regard its actions as measures of pure self-defense,
however. In the debates before the Organization of American States,
Mr. Facio, the delegate from Costa Rica, said:
But do not forget the principle of humanitarianism,
the principle of democratic representation, the principle of human rights. In the Dominican Republic, even
the most elemental institutions have been destroyed.
There is no government. The people are threatened
with death, hunger and plague. The political groups
have no control. We must act collectively to solve
this Dominican tragedy. 5
The resolution adopted with United States support by the Organization
of American States was cast in terms of restoring peace rather than
of preventing the establishment of a communist government. 6
Thus, the United States and troops from several Latin American
countries intervened in 1965 for reasons which do not seem very different from those advanced in the late nineteenth century at the time of the
Spanish-American war:
4.

5.
6.

"It is only the temporary presence of our forces in Santo Domingo
which has made it possible for the Organization of American States
to carry out its consultations, to organize its machinery and to
take its proper place on the scene of the fighting in the Dominican
Republic." Adlai Stevenson, N.Y. Times, May 6, 1965, p. 14,
col. 4.
"! based our legal right to act on the need to save lives and to
preserve a situation for a period of time which would enable the
Organization of American States to act collectively." UnderSecretary of State Thomas Mann, N.Y. Times, May 9, 1965,
Section 4, p. E3, col. 4.
Time, May 14, 1965, p. 33.
"This force will have as its sole purpose, in a spirit of democratic
impartiality, that of cooperating in the restoration of normal conditions in the Dominican Republic, in maintaining the security of its
inhabitants and the inviolability of human rights and in the establishment of an atmosphere of peace and conciliation that will permit the
functioning of democratic institutions." Organization of American
States Resolution, N.Y. Times, May 7, 1965, p. 14, col. 6.
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The forcible intervention of the United States as
a neutral to stop the war, according to the large
dictates of hUinanity and following many historical
precedents where neighboring states have interfered
to check the hopeless sacrifices of life by internecine conflicts beyond their borders, is justifiable
on rational grounds. • •• In the cause of hUinanity
and to put an end to the barbarities, bloodshed,
starvation, and horrible miseries now existing there,
and which the parties to the conflict are either unable
or unwilling to stop or mitigate. 7

The situation which the American President faced in 1965 was, of
course, considerably different from that faced by his predecessor at
the turn of the century. Two major differences are the existence of
the Organization of American States and the existence of an effective
Communist movement threatening established government in Latin
America. Nevertheless, there are elements in common which make
a study of past intervention relevant to the present decision-making
process.
The first major American military intervention designed to stem
political chaos in Latin America was in Cuba in 1898. That action
had been conditioned by a long line of legal and political thought concerning hUinanitarian intervention. This article discusses the theory
of humanitarian intervention and explores the problems in its application which American intervention in the Caribbean reveals.
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION UNDER GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
1.

State Practice:

There have been nUinerous occasions when one country has acted
directly to influence events occuring wholly within another country. 8
At least two military interventions were carried out by single powers
·in the name of humanitarian intervention: the United States intervened
in Cuba in 1898;9 and Russia intervened in Turkey on behalf of Bulgarian
nationalists in 1877 after two years of protest by other European powers
7.

President McKinley, [ 1898] Foreign Rel. 757 ( 190 1).

8.

Rou_9.ier, La Th~orie de !'Intervention d 1HUinanit{.' 17 Revue
Ge'nerale de Droit Iriternat10nal Pubhc 468 ( 19 Io ); Stowell,
Intervention in International Law ( 19 21).

9.

See p. 3 03 infra.
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had proven fruitless. 10 In addition to these examples of unilateral
intervention, there have also been instances of collective intervention. 11
During the nineteenth century the "Great Powers of Europe" determined state practice in the Western world. Thus, the intervention
in 1827 of the great powers of Europe on behalf of Greek freedom
showed state practice supporting the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. 12 Similarly, the intervention of France in Syria in 1860
was the result of agreement among the European powers. 13 The
intervention of the great powers of Europe and Japan in China in 1900
to compel the Emperor of China to ~uell the "Boxer" sect has also
been mentioned in this connection. 1
2.

Legal Theoreticians:

Where state practice is an imperfect guide, it is proper to turn
to scholars of international law.
A number of writers from the time of Grotius to the present have
clearly recognized the right of humanitarian intervention.
Intervention in the internal affairs of another state is
justifiable in two classes of cases ••.• The second is
when a country has fallen into such a condition of anarchy or misrule as unavoidably to disturb the peace,
external or internal, of its neighbors, whatever the
conduct or policy of its government may be in that
respect. l5
Other formulations of the right of humanitarian intervention differ
from this somewhat. 16 Nevertheless, these formulations apparently
10.

Rougier, supra note 8, at 474-475; Stowell, op. cit. supra note
8, at 127-136.

11.

A multitude of other occasions of intervention which did not reach
the stage of military action further illustrates the existence of
international concern in the internal affiars of a single nation. See
Rougier, supra note 8; Stowell, op. cit. supra note 8.

12.

Rougier, supra note 8, at 473; Stowell, op. cit. supra note 8, at
126-127.

13.

Rougier, supr_a note 8, at 473-474; Stowell, op. cit. supra note
8, at 63-66.

14.

Rougier, supra note 8, at 470.

15.

1 Westlake, International Law 318-319 (2d ed. 1910).

16.

Hodges, The Doctrine of Intervention 53-54 ( 1915); Grotius,
The Law of War and Peace, Bk. II, Ch. XX, Sec. VIII, at 504

HeinOnline -- 7 Harv. Int’l. L. Club J.

299 1965-1966

300

VOL. 7

agree on two points. First, in extreme cases there is a right to intervene in the conduct of a sovereign towards his subjects. Second, this
right is determined not by an invariable, objective rule, but by the
subjective standards of the world community (public scandal, shock
according to the sense of mankind, outrage to recognized principles
of decency and humanity, barbarity of measures, or misrule disturbing to the peace of neighboring states). Thus, the fundamental human
rights involved are subject to modification according to mankind's
increasing sensitivity toward the individual and human rights.
Such concepts do not go unchallenged. At least one writer has
denied that internal acts in one nation affect other nations:
Neighboring nations talk of the smoke of corpses rising
to their nostrils; if their sense of smell is so sensitive,
why aren't they trying to overcome the stink with the
perfume of their own actions? They say that the stench
corrupts the atmosphere, but there is a very simple way
to avoid it, i.e., establish a quarantine and break off all
relations with the nation that violates the laws of humanity.
Instead of peaceful means, neighboring nations speak of
shooting; but guns do not have, unless I am very much
mistaken, the gift of diminishing the number of corpses
or of disinfecting the atmosphere corrupted by their smoke. 17
Yet force can halt atrocities which might otherwise continue unchecked,
Some scholars have, nevertheless, disputed the legal basis for
military intervention. Theoretically, they argue, each state is independent and sovereign, and as such recognizes itself as the highest law. It
is bound by treaties only because it has made them binding upon itself. 18
A variation on this theme is the theory that intervention is proper only
in what are deemed less than "civilized" states. 19 These writers also
argue that the "Law of nations" is merely a law between sovereign states
and does not directly concern individuals. 20 "International law professes
(1646 ed. Kelsey trans!, The Classics of International Law No. 3,
1925); Rougier, supra note 8, at 517 -523; Stowell, op. cit.
sup;ra note 8, at 51-52; Wright, The Bombardmeiirof"'Diimascus
20 Am. J. Int'l L. 263, 269 ( 1926); Thomas & Thomas, Non-Intervention 378 (1956).
17.

Tanoviceano, Droit International de !'Intervention 12-13 ( 1884).

18. See von Floeckher, De !'Intervention en Droit International 18-19
(1896).
19. See Dickinson, The Equality of States in International Law 262-263
( 1920).
20.

1 Oppenheim, International Law, Sec. 292, at 368 (Zd ed. 1912).

HeinOnline -- 7 Harv. Int’l. L. Club J.

300 1965-1966

301

No. 2

to bf! concerned only with the relations of states to each other.
Tyrannical conduct of a government towards its subjects, massacres
and brutality in a civil war, or religious persecution, are acts which
have nothing to do directly or indirectly with such relations. "21
But these objections assume the very thing which is disputed.
Even if a state owes no duty to its subjects, it may owe other states
a duty to grant these same subjects rights under municipal law.
Under the minority system of the League of Nations some countries
were made responsible to the League for the proper treatment of
minorities within their borders. Other examples are found in Article
55 of the Charter of the United Nations and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 22 Under the European Convention on Human
Rights the individual in signatory states has a right to petition for
redress against his own government to an international court. Thus,
it is possible for international law to be concerned with the relationships between people within a single state. Indeed, the instances
which have been recited, the practice of intervention, and the opinions
of writers previously mentioned all indicate that international law is
concerned with such relationships.
Inaction by the world community in the face of the obvious abuse
of human rights has been taken to show state practice supporting the
theoretical lack of any international guarantee of such rights. 23
Lack of accurate information has been partially responsible for this,
but a second concern is the power of the violating nation. A nation
must weigh the effect of the violation of the laws of humanity on its
conscience against the impact which armed struggle would have
upon its population. This might be ignoble, but it does not make a
nullity of the doctrine.
One practical objection to humanitarian intervention is the
potentiality of its being abused. In an imperfect world decisionmaking humans can never be absolutely certain that they are on the
side which has the predominance of truth, justice, and morality.
Thus, precipitate action might set a bad precedent,which others
might follow. 24 One example of such abuse is the German invasion
of Czechoslovakia under a claim of intervention on behalf of the
persecuted racial German minority. 25 Thus, the doctrine can serve
21. Hall, International Law 342 (8th ed. Higgins, 1924).
22. General AssemblY; Resolution 217A, Gen. Ass. Off. Rec., 3d
Sess., 1st pt., Resolutions, at 71-77(A/.810) (1948).
23.

1 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 20, Sec. 292 at 369.

24.

See Bernard, On the Principle of Non-Intervention ( 1860).

25. Thomas & Thomas, op. cit. supra note 16, at 374.
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to mask the true designs of aggressors. 26 For this reason, at least
one writer would make non-intervention the legal rule. 11 The ordinary rule is good for ordinary cases, which, after all, make up at
least ninety-nine hundredths of life. To say that it is no rule because
it may laudably be ignored once or twice in a generation, is to overturn order in an attempt to exalt virtue. 11 27
On the other hand, it may be unwise to refuse a theory legitimacy
simply because it has been abused. It may be contended that forcible
intervention is itself "wrong" because it creates a breach of international peace. However, contempt for human rights is perhaps a
greater threat to peace than attempts to assert through intervention
the sanctity of human personality. Unless the right of intervention is.
asserted, the persecution will continue unchecked, 28 Thus, the value
of preventing further outrage may outweigh the harm done by intervention.
Finally, even those vociferous opponents of the legality of humanitarian intervention referred to above admit its moral justification. 29
For example, one such writer stated:
The law upholds as a principle the sovereignty and
equality of States from the greatest to the least, and,
as a corollary, prohibits intervention. Here, again,
in a hundred particular cases, there may be the most
powerful inducements to shake off the restraints of
the rule. Nay, there may even be cases in which it
becomes a positive duty to transgress it --in which
respect it does but resemble every other merely
human law. 30
The latest edition of Oppenheim's International Law recognizes the
propriety of collective intervention. "The notion and the prohibition
of intervention cannot accurately extend to collective action undertaken in the general interest of States or for the collective enforcement of International Law. 11 31
26. See Hall, op. cit. supra note 21, at 344.
27.

Lawrence, The Principles of International Law 129 (6th ed. 1915).

28.

See Thomas & Thomas, op. cit. supra note 15, at 374; H. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights 3 2 ( 19 50).

29. Lawrence, op. cit. supra note 27, at 129; von Floeckher, op. cit.
supra note Tif," at16; Hall, op. cit. supra. note 21, at 344-.30.

Bernard, op. cit, supra note 24, at 33-34.

31.

1 Oppenheim, International Law Sec. 140a at 319 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955).

HeinOnline -- 7 Harv. Int’l. L. Club J.

302 1965-1966

303

No. 2

Thus, there is virtual unanimity among writers on international
law t,!at some form of humanitarian intervention is either legally or
ethically proper. It would indeed be wrong to unnecessarily brand
conduct unlawful which is morally justified. The result would be to
restrain legally-minded nations from acting despite an overwhelming
need for action. The delay of the democracies in joining battle with
Hitler's Germany has shown what a tragic mistake this can be.
Therefore, since a particular intervention on behalf of humanity may
be regarded with favor by virtually all those concerned with the
advancement of international law, humanitarian intervention is lawful under general international law as an exception to the general
rule of non-intervention. Instead of labeling the exception as unlawful, the best procedure would be to identify the problems its
application involved and then establish safeguards to protect against
them.

PRACTICAL PROBLEMS:
THE EXAMPLE OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

1.

Problem of Perception:

While humanitarian intervention in some form may be lawful,
there are grave practical problems in its application, which an analysis of the United States intervention in Cuba in 1898 reveals.
The first problem is one of perception. At the time of the intervention in Cuba there were essentially three crucial parties --the
American public, the United States government, and the Spanish
government. American public opinion was based on newspaper
reports; the decisions of the governments of Spain and the United
States were based on reports from their representatives on the
island.
Sensational journalism was the primary source of information
for most Americans; in fact, the reading public thrived on excitement. It is not surprising, therefore, that "newspapers reported
that some four or five hundred thousand people -- a quarter of the
population --were dead, and the remainder diseased and starving. 11 32
One story has it that Frederic Remington told William Randolph
Hearst he could not do battle sketches because there was no war,
to which Hearst replied: "You furnish the pictures; I'll furnish the
war. "33
32.

Friedel, The Splendid Little War 4 (1958).

33.

Morgan, William McKinley and His America 330 ( 1963).
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A major source of information for the newspapers was the Cuban
Junta, a group of Cuban exiles and simpathizers whose purpose was
to propagandize for the rebel cause. 4 In December 1896 the New
York Journal cited many items of Spanish atrocity; all were intlle
form of letters or statements from "recently arrived" Cuban emigrants
and generally emanated from the Junta. 35
Richard Harding Davis, a Hearst correspondent, bore witness to
the insubstantiality of many of these tales:
I had been kept sufficiently long in Key West to learn
how large a proportion of Cuban war news is manufactured on the piazzas of the hotels of that town and
of Tampa by utterly irresponsible newspaper men who
accept every rumor that finds its way across the gulf,
and pass these rumors on to some of the New York
papers as facts coming directly from the field. 36
However, after travelling throughout the island and talking with the
people there, Davis sent this report: "Speaking dispassionately, and
with the knowledge of the details of many butcheries, it is iinpossible
for me to think of the Spanish guerrillas otherwise than as worse than
savage animals. , .• These guerrillas murder and then laugh over it.
These men kill to feed their vanity ... 37
But the press did not confine its outcry to charges of random
atrocities. The greatest clamor was directed at the policy of reconcentration instituted by General Valeriano Weyler. Davis wrote:
Thousands of human beings are now herded together
around the seaport towns of <;uba who cannot be fed,
who have no knowledge of cleanliness or sanitation,
who have no doctors to care for them and who cannot
care for themselves.
Many of them are dying of sickness and some of
starvation, and this is the healthy season. 38
Davis also reported that Wey1er 1 s policies did not even advance the
Spanish cause. He claimed that the rural population joined the
34. Morgan, op. cit. supra note 33, at 331.
35.

Wisan, The Cuban Crisis as Reflected in the New York Press
(1895 -1898) 66 (1934),

36. Davis, Cuba in War Time 103 (1897),
37.

Id. atll2.

38.

Id. at 54-55.
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insurgents rather than let themselves be herded into the cities. Those
who were forced into the towns --women, children, the aged, the infirm -- became an added burden to the Spanish residents there. The
devastation of the countryside did not succeed in hampering the insurgents since the rebels were accustomed to sleeping outdoors and foraging for themselves. 39 "So the order failed to distress those against
whom it was aimed, but brought swift and terrible suffering to those
who were and are absolutely innocent of any intent against the government, as well as to the adherents of the government. n40 At least one
writer found in the reported treatment of the civilian population by the
Spanish so severe a violation of the rules of civilized warfare that
intervention was authorized. 41
The resulting outcry of the American public led the President to
protect Spanish conduct by means of a diplomatic note. Secretary of
State Sherman sent a message to the Spanish Ambassador to the United
States, Depuy de Lome, which said in part, "He [the President] is
bound by the higher obligations of his representative office to protest
against the uncivilized and inhumane conduct of the campaign in the
island of Cuba. u42
The United States depended on its representa~ives for information.
The Consul-General in Havana, Fitzhugh Lee, held views which coincided in large measure with those held by Davis. Both men believed
that the war would continue until Spain was financially exhausted or
until another power intervened and that meanwhile Cuban agriculture
would be destroyed causing enormous loss of life and property.
Although Davis and Lee disagreed on Spanish intentions to institute
reforms, they did agree that n.p!hing approximating autonomy could
actually be instituted in Cuba.
The Consul in Matanzas, Mr. Brice, reported:
Over 2, 000 (I have the list of names) have died in this
city -- want of food -- since January 1 up to October 1,
1897 •••. Local authorities are powerless and unable
to cope with the situation. Cities and towns are bankrupt

39. Davis, op. cit. supra note 36, at 42-43.
40.

Id. at 43.

41.

Woolsey, America's Foreign Policy 63-64 (1898).

42. Sherman to de Lome, June 26, 1897. Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents 26 (1905) [hereinafter cited as Sp. Corr.].
43. Morgan, op. cit. supra note 33, at 341.
note 36, at3T,l34-43.
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and can give little or no relief to the starving
thousands. . .• Allow these people to go out into
the country and plant crops, and in less than sixty
days all will be well and starvation a thing of the
past. 44

Another set of reports encouraged restraint, however. United
States Ambassador Woodford in Spain urged that diplomacy could
accomplish all of the ends of military intervention. As late as April
of 1898 he wrote McKinley, "1 believe you will get final settlement
before August 1 on one of the following bases: Either such autonomy
as the insurgents may agree to accept, or recognition by Spain of the
independence of the island, or cession of the island to the United
States. rr45
In late 1897 the Spanish government recalled General Weyler and
sent General Blanco to Cuba. Blanco proclaimed autonomy and issued
edicts against reconcentration, but the giving of the orders did not in
its e 1 f
insure their accomplishment. On January 8, 1898, Lee
reported that reconcentration s~emed as flagrant as ever despite the
new edicts against the policy. 4

The belief that Spanish promises did not guarantee results was
strengthened by the riots which broke out in Havana on January 12,
1898. Lee telegraphed the next day: 11 After a day and night of excitement, all business suspended, and rioting, everything quiet at this
hour. • •• Mobs shouted yesterday, 1 Death to Blanco and death to
autonomy, 1 while 1 Viva Weyler 1 was frequently heard.rr47 The result
of the riots was a widespread conviction in the United States, shared
by the President, that autonomy had failed. 48
Thus, a basic lack of confidence in Spain• s ability --whatever her
intentions -- to fulfill her promises caused the President to embrace
the views of Lee and Brice and to reject those of Ambassador Woodford.
On April 1, 1898, the President told Congress:
The long trial has proved that the object for which Spain
has waged the war cannot be attained. The fire of
44. Report of Mr. Brice to Mr. Day, October 15, 1897. [ 1898]
ForeignRel. 596, 597(1901).
45.

Mr. Woodford to President McKinley, April 10, 1898. [ 1898]
Foreign Rel. 747 (1901).

46.

Morgan, op. cit. supra note 33, at 352.

47.

Mr. F. Lee to Mr. Day, January 13, 1898. [ 1898] Foreign
Rel. 1025 (1901).

48.

Benton, International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish
American War 107 ( 1908).
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insurrection may flame or may smolder with varying seasons, but it has not been and it is plain that
it cannot be extinguished by present methods. The
only hope of relief and repose from a condition
which can no longer be endured is the enforced
pacification of Cuba. 49

Spain did not deny that the war was causing immense suffering.
General Blanco wrote the Prime Minister of Spain:
The army, exhausted and anemic, filling the hospitals,
without the force to fight or hardly even to hold up its
weapons; more than three hundred thousand concentrados dying or starving, perishing from hunger and
misery around the cities; the people of the countryside
terrified, prey to genuine horror, forced to abandon
their farms or lands, suffering under the most hideous
tyranny, with no recourse to escape their terrible
situation except to go strengthen the rebel ranks. 50
Nevertheless, the Spanish government disagreed with the United
States government in assessing blame for this situation. The Spanish
felt that the rebels had no justification for starting the conflict.
Their position was adopted by the American journalist, George Rea:
"I lived in Cuba for five years previous to the insurrection, and spent
the best part of my time in the country, and I must say that if the
Cubans were oppressed, I failed to discover in what manner; for in
no other country is liberty of action more enjoyed than in Cuba. ,5!
Furthermore, Spain insisted that it had been the destruction of agriculture by the rebels not the reconcentration order, which had first
caused the people of the countryside to flock to the cities and towns
of the island. The order itself was merely a practical political
measure to isolate the rebels so that they could be identified and
captured, 52 and similar measures had in fact been taken by th~
United States in the past. 53
49.

(1898] Foreign Rel. 759 (1901).

50. May, Imperial Democracy; The Emergence of America as a Great
Power 163 (1961).
51. Rea, Facts and Fakes About Cuba 37 ( 1897).
52.

Duke of Tetuan to de Lome, August 4, 1897. Sp. Corr.
op. cit. supra note 51, at 90-97.

32~

Rea,

53. Benton, op. cit. supra note 48, at 107. Fuller, Spanish Treaty
Claims Comii11ss10n: Report 1901-1907 23 (1907); See note l
accompanying opinion of Commissioner Chandler at 2 71-282.
Compare treatment of Indians by the United States, and devastation
of the South in the Civil War. Sp. Corr. 28-35. Compare also the
strategic hamlet system employed on United States advice in South
Vietnam.
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Unlike the United States government, the Spanish felt the war
would soon end in the absence of outside interference.
The year 1898 opened with the formation of the insular
government of Cuba. It was not long before its beneficial effects made themselves felt as anticipated.
Many rich men who had voluntarily emigrated from
Cuba returned to their homes; discord and doubt began
to appear in the insurgent ranks; irr:portant adhesions
took place; and so much confusion was produced in the
rebel armies that it became necessary for their chiefs
to impose exemplary and severe punishments and
threaten with the penalty of death those who attempted
to give in their adhesion. 54
Spain believed that the prolongation of the war was due to the
encouragement received by the rebels from the United States: 11 The
reserve with which the new autonomous constitution was received
shows that there was a preconceived plan to render it nugatory and
cause it to break down in order to realize the covetous and traditional
ambition of North America. n55
The Spanish government was willing to rescind its policy of
reconcentration, to help resettle the Cuban population, to suspend
hostilities, and to grant a limited amount of autonomy; but it would
not consider granting independence. "The Spanish government and
the whole people of Spain maintain their absolute sovereignty over
the Spanish Antilles, which were discovered, peopled, civilized,
and enriched by the legitimate descendants of those who opened UP.
the American continent to the light of progress and Christianity. 11 56
If the United States had made it clear that it would not intervene
in Cuba for any cause at any time, there might have been endless
internecine warfare. On the other hand, if the insurgents had capitulated, there would have been no legitimate justification for United
States intervention. 57 Since action was taken, the result of inaction
is a matter of speculation.

54. Gullon to ambassadors abroad.

Sp. Corr. 128.

55. Ibid.
56. Id. at 131.
57. Intervention to help a colony free itself from a colonial power
may be permissable today. Cf. United Nations Resolutions on
Colonialism, e.g:, Gen. AsS':'"""Resolutlon 1514 (XV) of December 14, 1960: United Nations support of Indonesia m freemg
itself from the Netherlands; Sohn, The Role of the United Nations
in Civil Wars, 57 Am. Soc. Int'l L. Proceedings 208, 209 ( 1963).
Nevertheless, in 1898 such a right was not generally recognized.
Stowell, op. cit. supra note 8, at 345-49.

HeinOnline -- 7 Harv. Int’l. L. Club J.

308 1965-1966

No. 2

309

The recent intervention in the Dominican Republic provides a
striking parallel to our conduct in the Spanish-American War as
regards the problems of perception. The views of Dominican exPresident Juan Bosch c·oincided with those of a large segment of,
for example, the French press, which felt that the rebel movement
was in no danger of a communist takeover, and that without United
States intervention the rEbels would quickly have won a revolutionary
victory for the democratic left. 58 Senator William Fulbright, the
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, held the
following viewpoint:
The United States intervened forcibly in the Dominican
Republic in the last week of April 1965 not primarily
to save American lives, as was then contended, but to
prevent the victory of a revolutionary movement which
was judged to be Communist-dominated. • . . This was
based on fragmentary and inadequate evidence. . .• The
evidence suggests a chaotic situation in which no single
faction was dominant at the outset and in which everybody, including the United States, had opportunities to
influence the shape and course of the rebellion. 59
On the other hand, Fulbright's colleagues on the Committee had
a very different understanding of the situation. Senator Long asserted,
11 We had enough information to know that the Dominican revolt was a
move in the direction of communism. n60 Senator Smathers said:
The country was on fire; people were dying; property
was being destroyed; Communists were on hand and
chaos was in charge. • .• The overwhelming consensus
of advisors was of the belief that we had better send in
enough forces to make certain that the indiscriminate
shooting and looting would be stopped, and that the
Communists would not take over .••• At that time we
thought that some 1, 560 people were killed in the first
few days ••.• It may be that there were not 1, 560
people killed. However, many of them were killed,
and millions of dollars worth of property was destroyed. 61
Although we may speculate as to the accuracy of these varying
views of the situation in the Dominican Republic, the fact of intervention prevents our discovering the extent of Communist influence
and human suffering which would have existed if the United States
had followed a policy of non-intervention.
58.

Time, May 7, 1965, p. 32; L'Express, May 31-June 6, 1965,
p. 32-33.

59.

111 Gong. Rec. 23002, 23003 (1965).

60.

Id. at 23007.

61.

Id. at 23006, 23007.
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Problem of Who Should Intervene:

A second problem revealed by analysis of the Spanish-American
War is, simply, who should intervene. Acquiescence in intervention
may be taken as an acknowledgement of the propriety of humanitarian
intervention, but the Cuban experience indicates that this is not
always true. Passive acceptance by other nations of one country's
assertion of right does not necessarily establish it as an accepted
legal principle. The legal significance of inaction by other nations
in any instance of intervention requires a study of the worldwide
political situation at that time.
McKinley had known long before his intervention in Cuba that the
European powers would pose no serious threat to his plan. Ambassador
Woodford had sounded the depth of opinion among the continental powers
and reached the conclusion that despite their pro-Spanish inclination,
the continental powers would not risk war for the sake of Spain. 62
Both Germany and Russia feared the potential loss in trade and
investment with the United States which war with her might cause.
Even more than this, they feared that other European states might
take political advantage of such a war --watching them dissipate their
strength across the ocean and then attacking them. 63 Thus, these
nations demanded that all Europe unite behind Spain before they would
support her.
France feared a political and economic combination of America
and England against her interests in the Far East. Thus she demanded
that England be brought into the European combination before likewise
joining her forces behind Spain. 64
England, alone among European states, supported the United States.
The ties of language, culture and similarity of interest in the Far East
led the British to ignore past international political differences such as
the War of 1812 and the Venezuelan Boundary Dispute. Prime Minister
Balfour made it clear to Secretary of State Hay on April 6, 1898, that
"neither here nor in Washington did the British Government propose to

62. Morgan, op. cit. supra note 33, at 343: Letter from Woodford to
Sherman,l:ieilrils, Adventures in American Diplomacy 1896-1906
67 ( 1928).
63. Letter from Chancellor von Bulow to Prince Eulenberg, May,
op. cit. supra note 50, at 198. Report of the French Ambassador
on tarl<s w1th the Russian Foreign Minister, May, supra, at Zl0-11.
Letter from Ambassador Hay to Senator Henry Caoot Lodge, Dennis,
op. cit. supra note 62, at 98.
64.

May, op. cit. supra note 50, at 207.
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take any steps which would not be acceptable to the Government of the
United States. u65 Thus the chain of causes which might have prevented
United States intervention in Cuba was broken.
When the rest of the world refuses to take action, the decision is
left to the individual nation which must proceed on the basis of subjective criteria. As a result, some atrocities go unpunished by humanitarian
intervention while other atrocities are committed in the name of humanitarian intervention. Where the decision to intervene falls to a single
state, it should be safeguarded by a requirement that the state be totally
disinterested.
The United States, in fact, claimed to be a disinterested state in
the Spanish-American conflict. 66 It pointed to its humanitarian concern
and an express Congressional disclaimer of any int~ntion to exercise
any power of control over Cuba other. than to resolve the immediate
dispute. But America's claim to disinterestedness was controverted. 67
Public opinion was indeed largely based on humanitarian feeling, but a
great many other motives have been suggested:
For one thing, it is clear that various groups saw war
with Spain over Cuba as a means to solve other problems.
Many agrarians viewed it as a way to monetize silver at
home and thus pave the way for a general expansion of
their exports to the sterling areas of the world. Some
labor groups thought it would ease or resolve immediate
economic difficulties. And many important businessmen,
as contrasted with the editors of busmess publications,
came to support war for specific commercial purposes
as well as for general economic reasons. 68
Indeed, it is frequently claimed that business interests had a significant part in urging the United States to war. 69 The war sentiment of
"dollar diplomacy" is commonly assumed to have been prevalent at this
time. Many scholars of this period, however, would now disagree with
this assumption.

65.

Dennis, op. cit. supra note 62, at 72.

66. Stowell, op. cit. supra note 8, at 121 n. 53; Straus, Humanitarian
Diplomacyo:fthe Umted States, 6 Am. Soc. Int 1 1 L. Proceedmgs
45, S0-51 (1912); Draper, The Rescue of Cuba 52 (1899).
67.

See Rougier, supra note 8, at 503.

68.

Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy 32 (1959).

69.

Id. at 32-34.
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Actually, businessmen, far from perpetrating the
war, were, except for a few who made a living off
Cuban investment and trade, generally more reluctant than most citizens to disturb the ordinary pattern
of peace and commerce; They were largely opposed
or indifferent to the selfish, material aspects of the
enterprise until the acquisition of the Philippines
raised great hopes for new markets. 70

President McKinley was impressed by the humanitarian call to
rescue Cuba from utter annihilation, 71 but he relied heavily on the
support of leading businessmen who were at first opposed to risking
war. 72 In time, however, the business community ceased to oppose
the pressure of public opinion for intervention. The Cuban situation
had caused such a disequilibrium in the United States that the risks
of armed intervention seemed minor compared to the advantage of
bringing peace to Cuba. Unless the businessmen had supported
intervention, they would have been prone to public condemnation as
cowardly, mercenary and inhumane. Since it was now clear that the
European powers would not support Spain, it probably seemed safe
to businessmen to follow the lead of public opinion and support
McKinley in whatever he chose to do.
There was, in addition, another factor acting on both the business
community and the President; namely, the small but vocal group of
expansionists whose arguments helped the business communit7 perceive the economic advantages of conquest in the Philippines. 3
Sea power, new markets, new investment opportunities, protection of trade routes, territorial expansion -- all these were bound up with a genuine
missionary zeal, but as far as Mahan, Roosevelt,
Lodge and Albert J. Beveridge were concerned, they
were probably sufficient reasons in themselves for
meeting the moribund Spanish Empire in battle. 74
Ambassador Woodford stated that the war began as a result of
popular indignation at particular incidents -- a letter critical of
McKinley by the Spanish Ambassador; the explosion of the battleship
70. Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations
44 (1953), See May, op. cit. supra note 50, at 90.
71. Morgan, op. cit. supra note 33, at 335.
72. May, op. cit. supra note 50, at 118.
73. Morgan, op. cit. supra note 33, at 332.
74. Osgood, op. cit. supra note 71, at 45.
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Maine; and, in light of widespread anti-Catholicism in the United
States, the suggestion of the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs that
the request of the Pope for an armistice was at the instance of
McKinley. 75 But these incidents would not have caused war unless
the public had been awaiting it. 76
McKinley 1 s intervention message to Congress enumerated
several motives for intervention in addition to the humanitarian
one -- among them were the protection of American lives and property in Cuba, the prevention of injury to the commerce of the United
States, and the necessity of keeping the Cuban situation from becoming a threat to the security of the United States. 77
American intervention, then, was based on varied motives. It
may be that humanitarian concern was primary. Once in the war,
however, more hidden motives emerged, to be reflected in the
results of the experience.
Americans began the war not out of a realistic calculation of national advantage but largely as an idealistic crusade to free the Cubans from Spain 1 s imperial
shackles. Yet they ended it with a far-flung empire
of their own from the Philippines to Hawaii to Puerto
Rico. They undertook the war as a local action, but
their victory affected the relations among all the great
powers of the world, 78
The results of the Spanish-American War demonstrate how
hidden, selfish motives may be mingled with publicized altruistic
ones and ultimately come to predominate. For this reason, it is
necessary to determine whether an interested party may properly
intervene at all. The authorities disagree sharply. 79
Governments are not usually willing to sacrifice the lives of
their own people where no compensation is involved. Even when they
are shocked by the actions of another government, and would approve
of measures to stop it, no single government is willing to expend the
money and manpower necessary for action.
75, Benton, op. cit. supra note 48, at 88 n. 11.
76.

Moore, The Principles of American Diplomacy 208 ( 1918).

77. [ 1898] Foreign Rel. 75 7 ( 1901 ).
78. Osgood, op. cit. supra note 71, at 42.
79. Stowell, op. cit. supra note 8, at 62-64 n. 14: Benton, op. cit.
supra note4B,at 104.
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Analysis of the Spanish-American War does not solve the problem,
First, we cannot know how a failure to intervene would have resulted.
Second, the results of the intervention were ambiguous. Death and
disease on the island were reduced sharply, and Cuba eventually
received its independence. On the other hand, the Platt Amendment,
adopted in the wake of the war, led to United States intervention in the
internal politics of Cuba and a history of resentment against United
States economic and political control, culminating in today 1 s phenomenon of Fidel Castro.
In the Dominican Republic, peace of some sort has also been
, achieved; but we do not yet know at what price to the future of our
relations with the countries of Latin America and to our own sense of
propriety in future actions. In the Dominican Republic itself there
have been riots recently which apparently manifest a rampant antiAmerican feeling. 80 Although one might point to the action of the
Organization of American States as showing a consensus among the
nations of the Western Hemisphere on the propriety of the action, it
is equally sound to argue that the Organization of American States
acted only because the United States intervention caused what would
have been a successful revolution to degenerate into a stalemated
bloodbath.
Conclusion
It would appear that the problems revealed by this study are just
those considerations which the peace-keeping machinery of the Organization of American States and the United Nations was designed to
meet. If a right to intervene is based on the existence of a particular
situation, the situation should exist in reality and not just in the eyes
of one intervening power. However, the inaccessability of absolute
truth should not bar action. Intervention on behalf of humanity may be
necessary even though there is no guarantee that it is based on wholly
accurate views of the situation. Knowledge of the problems involved
provides a warning to establish safeguards in order to approach as
closely as possible the right action.
All sides must be heard and the evidence gathered as accurately
and exhaustively as possible in the time available. If a very high
proportion of nations fails to agree on the same interpretation of the
evidence, no action should be taken. These safeguards are found in
the peace-keeping-machinery of both the United Nations and the
Organization of American States. Therefore, intervention by a single
state should be based on the collective findings of these organizations
and not merely on its own intelligence reports.
The cessation of protracted internecine warfare resulting from
intervention in Cuba in 1898 and the Dominican Republic in 1965
80.

N. Y. Times, February 9, 1966, p. 1, col. 6.

HeinOnline -- 7 Harv. Int’l. L. Club J.

314 1965-1966

315

No. 2

underscore the need for a power of intervention. When inaction on the
part of all other nations makes it necessary, an interested nation
should be permitted to intervene. Detrimental results of those interventions indicate, on the other hand, that such action must have international approval.
In the Spanish-American War the nations of continental Europe
supported Spain in principle, although they were unwilling to support
their belief with force. Therefore, the unilateral intervention of the
United States was unlawful. In the Dominican Republic intervention of
1965 the United States acted before world opinion had been expressed.
Although the dangers of delay may require action to be taken before the
evidence of the grounds for action is conclusive, principles of internationallaw require a consensus of nations that the evidence of danger
is sufficiently persuasive to warrant intervention. Ex post facto
approval provides no safeguard to the dangers of hasty action by an
interested party. Therefore, once again, the United States has acted
wrongly.
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